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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE  
LEGISLATION:  AN IRONIC RETURN TO 
LOCHNERIAN IDEOLOGY WHEN PUBLIC 
SECTOR LABOR CONTRACTS ARE 
IMPAIRED 
NILA M. MEROLA† 
INTRODUCTION 
Rochelle Johnson is a state worker in Sacramento, 
California.  Ms. Johnson’s $38,000 annual salary has been cut by 
approximately fourteen percent due to the state’s mandate that 
more than 200,000 workers take three unpaid days off per 
month.1  While her modest salary never allowed her to live in 
luxury, Ms. Johnson now struggles just to keep the power on in 
her home and to provide basic necessities for her two children.2  
About her ability to make ends meet, Johnson professed, “I just 
feel like I’m less than a parent.”3  Though the reduction in 
liquidity has threatened the sustainability of Ms. Johnson’s 
already conservative lifestyle, the slow stripping away of her 
dignity is perhaps her greatest loss of all.   
California’s furloughs—or involuntary,4 unpaid days off from 
work5—are not a national outlier.  In fact, twenty-five other 
states have resorted to some type of furlough program in an 
 
† St. John's Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2011, St. John’s University School of 
Law; B.S., 2008, Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations. 
1 Shane Goldmacher, California; Workers Pay for Furloughs; Many Are Unable 
To Make Mortgage or Car Payments or Even Buy Enough Food. Some Face 
Bankruptcy. Biden and Feinstein Protest, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2009, at A39. 
2 Id. (noting that Ms. Johnson’s power had already been shut off once). 
3 Id.  
4 Not all furloughs are involuntary. Sometimes “furlough” is used to refer to a 
vacation. However, this Note will refer to furloughs exclusively as involuntary 
unpaid days off from work mandated by the state.   
5 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 745 (9th ed. 2009). 
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effort to reduce enormous budget gaps.6  As half of the states 
project a cumulative budget shortfall of $145 billion for fiscal 
year 2010,7 the states’ desires to expeditiously identify and 
implement measures to reduce these deficits are apparent.  
However, some of the means chosen to achieve this goal—laws 
that impose furloughs or wage freezes on unionized public sector 
employees—may be an abuse of states’ police powers and an 
unconstitutional impairment of public sector labor contracts.   
In response to these laws, labor unions across the country 
have sued, alleging that the furloughs and wage freezes violate 
the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution, which 
proscribes states from enacting laws that impair contractual 
obligations.8  Most recently, a United States district court in 
Maryland found that an employee furlough plan implemented by 
Prince George’s County was unconstitutional under the Contract 
Clause.9  Many unions view the Prince George’s decision as a 
collective victory not only because the court invalidated the 
furloughs but also, and perhaps more importantly, because the 
court was willing to strictly scrutinize the furlough legislation.10   
Indeed, before ultimately concluding that the furloughs were 
unconstitutional, the court undertook a rather extensive analysis 
of the furlough legislation, throughout which the court examined 
whether the law was reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.11  The court showed great sympathy 
for the policymakers’ plight of closing soaring budget gaps amidst 
this “global recession” and acknowledged that a certain degree of 
deference must be accorded to lawmakers’ fiscal decisions  The 
court also noted, however, that it “cannot merely give lip service 
to the fundamental principles that undergird the Contract 
Clause of the United States Constitution” and that “[t]o do 
otherwise, even in these severe economic times, would sanction 
 
6 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ACTIONS & PROPOSALS TO 
BALANCE THE FY 2010 BUDGET: STATE EMPLOYEE ACTIONS, FURLOUGHS AND 
LAYOFFS (2009), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=17244. 
7 Id. 
8 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law 
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”). 
9 See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty. (Prince 
George’s I), 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 518 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 
2010). 
10 See id. 
11 See id. at 510–18. 
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the County running roughshod over the Unions, who in good 
faith negotiated a binding contract with the County.”12  The 
Prince George’s Court’s refusal to allow state legislatures to run 
“roughshod”13 over public sector unions through an unchecked 
use of police power and under the guise of fiscal necessity is 
strikingly reminiscent of the now infamous, widely criticized, and 
allegedly abandoned judicial activism of the “Lochner era,” 
spawned by the 1905 Supreme Court decision, Lochner v. New 
York.14   
The labor unions’ Prince George’s victory, however, was 
short-lived.  On June 23, 2010, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court in a 
nine-page opinion.15  Nevertheless, the district court’s opinion is 
groundbreaking in its scrutiny of state legislation, instructive to 
other courts analyzing similar issues and, indeed, the focus of 
this Note.16  While the Fourth Circuit’s opinion will be discussed 
only briefly, it is further evidence of the rift among the courts in 
their willingness to strictly scrutinize state legislation under 
Lochner-like jurisprudence.   
In addition to the Prince George’s courts, other state, district, 
and appellate courts around the country have elected to review 
state legislation that impairs public contracts with greater 
scrutiny.17  Because the laws in question are predominately 
economic or social, this jurisprudential approach is quite 
controversial, as, since the end of the Lochner era, greater 
deference is typically given to the legislatures in determining 
whether the laws are reasonable and necessary to achieve a 
compelling public purpose.18  In fact, even the courts seem to be 
split on whether second guessing legislative economic and social 
decisions is an appropriate judicial role.  While those courts that 
are willing to give less deference to the legislature face criticism 
from some for returning to Lochner-like judicial activism, these 
courts should be applauded, rather than rebuked.   
 
12 Id. at 518. 
13 Id. 
14 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
15 See Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s Cnty. (Prince 
George’s II), 608 F.3d 183, 185 (4th Cir. 2010). 
16 Unless otherwise indicated, “Prince George’s” is in reference to the district 
court opinion. 
17 See infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra note 50 and accompanying text. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1179 (2010) 
1182 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:1179   
These courts deserve praise because they demonstrate that 
the proper role of the courts is to say “no” only after a substantive 
review reveals that legislation is inconsistent with the 
Constitution, not because it is the judiciary’s job is to sit as a 
super-legislature or because they invalidate laws based on 
differing ideology or economic opinion.19  This type of 
jurisprudence is not paternalistic protectionism but is, in fact, 
the judicial function that Lochner stood for all along.  Though the 
Court claimed to have discarded Lochner in the 1930s, the 
pendulum seems to be swinging back to a more scrutinizing 
judiciary.  In fact, Lochner still lives in the fabric of 
contemporary jurisprudence but now in a positive, responsible, 
and more authentic capacity.   
This Note argues that, despite its notorious reputation as the 
case that permitted and encouraged judicial usurpation of the 
states’ inherent police powers,20 a return to a Lochnerian level of 
review of economic legislation is appropriate when state or local 
legislatures pass laws that substantially impair public sector 
labor contracts.  Part I briefly recaps the Lochner era, beginning 
with an overview of Lochner itself and culminating in a brief 
discussion of the criticisms of Lochner.  Part II introduces the 
Contract Clause and demonstrates that the contemporary test for 
determining whether there has been a Contract Clause violation 
is similar to the Lochner Court’s analysis for whether the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process guarantee of 
liberty of contract had been violated.   
Part III reveals that Lochner’s legacy may positively live on 
by protecting public sector employees from substantial 
contractual impairments, despite the nefarious connotation of the 
“Lochner” name.  First, through an in-depth review of two cases, 
Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince George’s County21 and Buffalo 
 
19 See Randy Barnett, A Libertarian View: Judicial Activism Is Necessary, 
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 27, 1987, at 13. 
20 Federal Court of Appeals Judge Robert Bork denounced Lochner as “the 
symbol, indeed the quintessence, of judicial usurpation of power.” ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 44 (1991). Even 
now, Chief Justice John Roberts, during his Senate confirmation hearings, criticized 
Lochner: “You go to a case like the [Lochner] case, you can read that opinion today 
and it’s quite clear that they’re not interpreting the law, they’re making the law.” 
Transcript: Day Two of the Roberts Confirmation Hearings, WASH. POST, Sept. 13, 
2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/ 
09/13/AR2005091300876.html. 
21 645 F. Supp. 2d 492 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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Teachers Federation v. Tobe,22 Part III shows that courts struggle 
and vary with the amount of deference owed and given to state 
legislatures.  Additionally, Part III illustrates that, without strict 
scrutiny, courts may be reluctant to find contract-impairing laws 
in violation of the Contract Clause, leaving public sector 
employees unprotected from unconstitutional state legislation.  
In light of the tumultuous economy and the states’ increasing 
resort to furloughs and wage freezes to close budget gaps, Part 
III concludes with a call to the courts to responsibly use the 
power that they wield and place a limit on the states’ “unbounded 
power . . . where legislation of this character is concerned, and 
where the protection of the Federal Constitution is sought.”23 
I. LOCHNER REVISITED 
A. Lochner: Its Jurisprudential Ramifications, Progeny, and 
Demise   
In Lochner v. New York, the Supreme Court held that a New 
York law proscribing a bakery employer from requiring or 
permitting an employee to work more than ten hours in one day 
or sixty hours in one week was unconstitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.24  The 
Court stated that the Fourteenth Amendment protects an 
individual’s liberty to enter into contracts in relation to his or her 
business and found that the New York law interfered with this 
right.25  The Court did not hold, however, that the state can never 
enact laws that interfere with constitutional liberties or rights.   
Instead, the Court noted that state sovereignty is preserved 
in the states’ inherent “police powers” to pass laws that restrict 
individual liberties yet simultaneously serve the “safety, health, 
morals, and general welfare of the public.”26  The Court made 
clear, however, that there must be limits on the states’ police 
power.27  Otherwise, the Court opined, “the 14th Amendment 
would have no efficacy . . . and it would be enough to say that any 
piece of legislation was enacted to conserve the morals, the 
 
22 464 F.3d 362 (2d Cir. 2006). 
23 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 53. 
26 Id. 
27 See id. at 56. 
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health, or the safety of the people.”28  The rule, therefore, that 
emerges from Lochner is that the states have the power to pass 
laws that promote the public welfare.  The judiciary, however, 
has the power to determine whether those laws actually do 
achieve a common social good or whether they are merely an 
unnecessary and unreasonable restriction of individual liberties, 
crafted under the pretext of state sovereignty. 
Ultimately, the Lochner Court found that the law at issue 
was an abuse of New York’s police powers.29  The Court stated 
that there was no “reasonable” grounds for finding that the law 
was neither “necessary [n]or appropriate” to safeguard the public 
health, as the occupation of a baker is not an unusually 
hazardous one.30  Moreover, the Court explained that bakers are 
not a class inferior in intelligence or competence than men of 
other trades or occupations so as to require the arm of the state 
to interfere with a baker’s right to sell and an employer’s right to 
buy labor on contractual terms that both parties see fit.31  
Therefore, when the law’s end is not legitimate and the law itself 
is a palpable invasion of a constitutional right, the courts must 
find the state’s chosen means an unconstitutional interference 
with individual liberties.32   
The Lochner decision marked the beginning of an era in 
which the judiciary strictly scrutinized the reasonableness and 
necessity of state laws to ensure that the states did not overstep 
their police powers.33  For the next thirty years, the Court freely 
substituted its own judgment for that of the legislature and 
invalidated nearly two hundred social welfare and regulatory 
measures.34  To illustrate, in the 1908 decision, Adair v. United 
States,35 the Supreme Court invalidated a federal law banning 
“yellow-dog” contracts—an adhesion contract imposed by the 
employer upon the employee in which the employee, as a 
 
28 Id. 
29 See id. at 58. 
30 See id. at 58–59. 
31 See id. at 56–57. 
32 Id. at 61–62. 
33 See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 
373–74 (2003). 
34 See id. at 373 (explaining that Lochner symbolizes an entire era in which the 
Supreme Court struck down various social legislation, including minimum wage 
laws and laws designed to enable employees to unionize). 
35 208 U.S. 161 (1908). 
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condition of employment, agrees not to join a union.36  In finding 
the act at issue “repugnant to the 5th Amendment,”37 the Court 
returned to laissez faire economic theory and, in language similar 
to that in Lochner, deemed the “right of a person to sell his labor 
upon such terms as he [considers] proper [to be] the same as the 
right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions.”38  The 
Court stated that an employer and his employees “have equality 
of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an 
arbitrary interference with the liberty of contract.”39  As seen in 
Adair, the Lochner era cases recognized the existence of states’ 
police powers, but infrequently deferred to legislative 
decisionmaking.40 
Not until 1937 did the Lochner era come to an end.41  The 
United States was beginning to recover from the deepest and 
most prolonged economic depression in American history.  It was 
a time that today feels more familiar than it does distant and is 
now more recognizable than it is obscure.42  As the tumultuous 
economy of the 1930s began to raise American consciousness to 
the improprieties occurring in the workplace, economic policy 
began to shift from classical to Keynesian theory, and Lochnerian 
ideology was abandoned.43  Additionally, the composition and 
 
36 Id. at 180. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 174. 
39 Id. at 175. 
40 See generally Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (declaring 
unconstitutional a New York state minimum wage law); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. 
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (declaring unconstitutional a federal statute establishing a 
pension fund for railway workers); Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) 
(declaring unconstitutional a federal statute providing for minimum wages for 
women and children in the District of Columbia); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 
(1915) (declaring unconstitutional a state law that forbade employers to require 
employees to agree not to join labor organizations). 
41 See Strauss, supra note 33 (noting that West Coast Hotel marked the end of 
the Lochner era and that “[b]y the early 1940s, Lochner’s status as a pariah was 
secure”). 
42 See Mitchell H. Rubenstein, Obama’s Big Deal; The 2009 Federal Stimulus; 
Labor and Employment Law at the Crossroads, 33 RUTGERS L. REC. 1, 2 (2009) 
(discussing the similarities between the economic situations faced by FDR and 
Obama when they stepped into office and explaining the need for social change and 
reform of labor and employment legislation).  
43 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1358 (3d ed. 2000).  
No longer could it be argued with great conviction that the invisible hand of 
economics was functioning simultaneously to protect individual rights and 
to produce a social optimum. The legal ‘freedom’ of contract and property 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1179 (2010) 
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philosophy of the Supreme Court had changed significantly since 
Lochner.44  In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,45 the Court sustained 
a state minimum wage law for women and noted that, when it 
comes to the relationship between an employer and employee, 
“the Legislature has necessarily a wide field of discretion.”46  The 
Court not only began to afford state legislatures greater 
discretion in the exercise of their police powers,47 but also 
departed from the notion that freedom of contract is an 
untouchable constitutional right.48   
Just two years after West Coast Hotel, Justice Stone, in 
United States v. Carolene Products,49 inserted one of the most 
talked about footnotes in constitutional law.  Footnote four 
suggested that the Court would apply minimal scrutiny—or 
rational basis scrutiny—to economic regulation, but would apply 
strict scrutiny to legislation that prejudiced personal rights, such 
as freedom of expression or religion.50  The Court intimated that 
a “more searching judicial inquiry” was necessary to protect 
“discrete and insular minorities” when the political process 
fails.51  Immediately following West Coast Hotel and Carolene 
Products, the Supreme Court upheld a host of New Deal 
 
came increasingly to be seen as an illusion, subject as it was to impersonal 
economic forces. 
. . . .  
Thus, the basic justification for judicial intervention under Lochner—that 
the courts were restoring the natural order which had been upset by the 
legislature—was increasingly perceived as fundamentally flawed. There 
was no . . . economic order to upset or restore, and legislative . . . decision in 
any direction could neither be restrained nor justified on any such basis. 
Id.   
44 See id. at 1359. 
45 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
46 Id. at 393. 
47 See id. at 397–99. 
48 See id. at 391–400. 
49 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
50 See id. at 153 n.4; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene 
Products, SUPREME CT. REV. 397, 399 (1988) (“By separating economic and personal 
liberties, Justice Stone suggested that the Court might really mean what it said 
about deference to the legislative will in economic cases.”); Richard A. Epstein, 
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 703 (1984) 
(“Today the general view is that constitutional protection is afforded to economic 
liberties only in the few cases of government action so egregious and outrageous as 
to transgress the narrow prohibitions of substantive due process.”). 
51 Caroline Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4.   
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1179 (2010) 
2010] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1187 
legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act,52 the Fair 
Labor Standards Act,53 and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.54   
In the next three decades, the Court moved further away 
from the judicial activism of the Lochner era and sustained 
numerous state economic legislations.55  In 1963, the Supreme 
Court demonstrated that Lochner was but a distant memory in 
Ferguson v. Skrupa.56  Writing for the Court, Justice Black stated 
that “[i]t is up to the legislatures, not the courts, to decide on the 
wisdom and utility of legislation,”57 and “[t]he doctrine that 
prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins . . . and like cases—that 
due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since 
been discarded.”58  Thus, Lochner was a dead-letter to most, 
symbolizing a thirty-year hiccup in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
with activist ideology that was at last a relic, rather than a 
reality. 
B. Lochner’s Critics 
Lochner is arguably the most rebuked Supreme Court 
decision of all time.59  To “Lochnerize” is widely understood to 
 
52 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937). 
53 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125–26 (1941). 
54 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
55 See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding a law 
regulating opticians and optometrists); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Nw. Iron & 
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 537 (1949) (upholding a state “right-to-work” law that 
barred a preference for union membership in employment decisions); Olsen v. 
Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246–47 (1941) (upholding a Nebraska statute fixing 
maximum fees for employment agencies). 
56 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
57 Id. at 729. 
58 Id. at 730. 
59 See, e.g., BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 
23 (1st ed. 1980) (describing Lochner as “one of the most condemned cases in United 
States history . . . used to symbolize judicial dereliction and abuse” and noting “the 
animosity and contempt that erupted against” the Lochner line of substantive due 
process cases); Strauss, supra note 33 (stating that Lochner “would probably win the 
prize, if there were one, for the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred 
years”); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 604–05 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (warning against a return to Lochner-style judicial review characteristic 
of laissez-faire economics and reiterating that “[t]he practice of deferring to 
rationally based legislative judgments is a paradigm of judicial restraint” (internal 
citations omitted)); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 74–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude workplace 
regulation and criticizing the majority’s use of laissez-faire economic theory in its 
due process analysis). 
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refer to a fundamental judicial error.60  The principal criticism is 
that Lochner was wrong because it involved “judicial activism,” a 
usurpation of the legislative branch’s traditionally and 
constitutionally reserved lawmaking power.61  The Supreme 
Court has perhaps been the biggest critic of Lochnerian 
philosophy.  In Lochner itself, both Justice Holmes and Justice 
Harlan dissented.  First, Justice Holmes rejected the premise of 
limited government and took the position that the courts have no 
right to “embody their opinions in law” and that “state laws may 
regulate life in many ways which [the Court] as legislators might 
think as injudicious.”62  Justice Harlan, joined by Justice White 
and Justice Day, maintained that it was possible to place limits 
on police power, yet still uphold the maximum hour legislation at 
issue in Lochner.63   
The Lochner dissenters urged the Court to exercise more 
restraint in its scrutiny of state legislation and to afford state 
legislatures a bit more deference in what policy truly did serve 
the health, safety, and welfare of the public.64  In 1963, Justice 
Black wrote that “the original constitutional proposition [is] that 
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the 
judgment of legislative bodies.”65  And most recently, in 2008, 
Justice Thomas stated in his concurring opinion in 




60 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 567 (2d ed. 
1988) (“ ‘Lochnerizing’ has become so much an epithet that the very use of the label 
may obscure attempts at understanding.”); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment 
During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 
STAN. L. REV. 555, 556–57 (1996). 
61 Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 874 (1987) 
(explaining that the lesson learned from Lochner is that the Court should provide 
more deference to legislative enactments).   
62 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
63 See id. at 68 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
64 See Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and 
Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 720–21 (2005) (referring to Justice 
Holmes as “[t]he true outlier” by not joining Justice Harlan’s dissent and instead 
offering a “parliamentary model of democracy: the legislature can do whatever it 
likes”). But see Gerald Leonard, Holmes on the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1001, 
1004–05 (2005) (stating that Holmes was “far from alone” in advocating substantial 
deference to the legislature, and that Harlan’s words were “pretty strong, but they 
only echoed the ‘reasonable doubt’ or ‘doubtful case’ rule”).  
65 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
66 553 U.S. 16 (2008). 
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“divining from the Fourteenth Amendment a right” not 
enumerated in the Constitution “bears a striking resemblance to 
our long-rejected Lochner-era precedents.”67  
As indicated by Justice Thomas’s concurrence,68 part of the 
judicial activism condemnation involves the argument that the 
Lochner Court devised and enforced a right—“the right of 
contract between the employer and employees”69—that is neither 
explicitly stated in nor readily inferred from the text of the 
Constitution.70  The Court stated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees that “no state can deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law,”71 and 
freedom of contract, while unenumerated, is nevertheless a 
fundamental right.72  That freedom of contract is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and is, therefore, considered by many to 
be attenuated at best.  Like the criticisms of Roe v. Wade,73 in 
which the Court found that, within the penumbras of the 
Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, there lies a fundamental 
“freedom of privacy”74—another right conspicuously absent from 
the text of the Constitution—Lochner is admonished not only for 
the Court supplanting its own judgment for that of the states75 
but also for enforcing a right seemingly fabricated by the Court, 
rather than conceived by the Framers.76  Despite these criticisms, 
however, Lochner is still a part of American jurisprudence.  And 
when applied in the right circumstances, it operates as an 
imperative check on state legislative power and affords the public 
a safeguard from unconstitutional state legislation.  
 
67 Id. at 32–34 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
68 By stating that “divining from the Fourteenth Amendment a right” not found 
in the Constitution, Justice Thomas seems to agree with Lochner’s critics that it is 
not within the Court’s power to simply create constitutional rights that are not 
readily found in the Constitution itself. Id. (emphasis added).   
69 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
70 See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (“What is this 
freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of contract.”); Strauss, supra 
note 33, at 374, 378–81.  
71 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53.  
72 See id.  
73 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
74 Id. at 153 (“[The] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment[ ] . . . or . . . the Ninth Amendment[ ] . . . is broad enough to encompass 
a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).   
75 See Sunstein, supra note 61. 
76 See Strauss, supra note 33, at 374, 378–81. 
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II. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE COURT’S LOCHNER-LIKE 
LEVEL OF REVIEW 
When examining claims under the Contract Clause, the 
Supreme Court uses an analysis that is remarkably similar to 
that of the Lochner Court.  The Contract Clause of the United 
States Constitution provides that “No State shall . . . pass 
any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.”77  Like the 
Fourteenth Amendment was in Lochner, the Contract Clause has 
been, and still is, a check on the states’ police powers.78  While on 
its face the Contract Clause appears absolute, it is not a complete 
prohibition on the states’ rights to pass legislation to serve the 
public interest, even if those laws incidentally impair contracts.79  
Instead, the Court has devised a three-prong test to determine 
whether a state has, in fact, violated the Contract Clause.80  The 
application of this test has emerged most recently in determining 
the constitutionality of furloughs imposed on unionized public 
sector employees.81  Part II.A briefly explores the origins, history, 
and contemporary revitalization of the Contract Clause.  Part 
II.B demonstrates that Contract Clause jurisprudence is not at 
all different from Lochnerian Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process jurisprudence.   
A. Origin, History, and Contemporary Revitalization Origin of 
the Contract Clause: The Framers’ Intent 
The Framers’ intent in including the Contract Clause in the 
Constitution is murky and provides little help to courts in 
 
77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 
78 See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21–24 (1977) (“[P]rivate 
contracts are not subject to unlimited modification under the police power.”); 
Thomas H. Lee, Jr., Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore: Does the 
Contract Clause Have Any Vitality in the Fourth Circuit?, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1633, 
1639–40 (1993) (“[T]he Court determined that the police power doctrine does not 
excuse states from binding [contractual] obligations . . . .”). 
79 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 20 (“Although the Contract Clause appears 
literally to proscribe ‘any’ impairment, this Court observed in Blaisdell that ‘the 
prohibition is not an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a 
mathematical formula.’ ” (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 
398, 428 (1934))). 
80 See, e.g., Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d 183, 188–89 (4th Cir. 2010); Buffalo 
Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006). 
81 See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 508–10 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 
F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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understanding exactly how to apply the Contract Clause today.82  
Perhaps most importantly, the origin of the Contract Clause 
offers little guidance in how broadly or narrowly the clause is to 
be construed.83  There is some indication that the clause was 
drafted exclusively to protect creditor’s rights and to prevent the 
states from enacting debtor relief laws in the aftermath of 
Shays’s Rebellion—a post-Revolutionary War revolt by struggling 
farmers aimed at stopping courts from carrying out 
foreclosures.84  It is not conclusive, however, that this was the 
Framer’s sole motivation in including the clause in the 
Constitution.85  The principal question nevertheless remains:  
How expansive is the Contract Clause’s scope?   
Given its broad language, if read literally, the breadth of the 
Contract Clause could potentially eviscerate state sovereignty 
and greatly limit state police powers by not permitting the states 
to enact any legislation that impaired contractual obligations, no 
matter how incidental the impairment or how compelling the 
larger societal interest.86  On the other hand, if interpreted too 
narrowly, courts would essentially be writing a blank check to 
the legislatures to enact whatever laws they choose, even if they 
unnecessarily and unreasonably impair contractual obligations.  
Despite these questions, not much is revealed from the political 
and social context of the clause,87 and even less can be gleaned 
 
82 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 707 (“There is very little reason to think that 
the framers had any theory about the contract clause, or pondered its implications 
for cases to which it would be applied.”).  
83 See id. at 717.  
84 JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, A PRACTICAL COMPANION TO THE CONSTITUTION: HOW 
THE SUPREME COURT HAS RULED ON ISSUES FROM ABORTION TO ZONING 326 (1999). 
There is some authority that indicates that the policy underlying the Contract 
Clause was chiefly to protect creditor’s rights. In 1785 and 1786, a depression 
threatened the lives and businesses of small farmers. Id. at 461. The rise of 
foreclosures prompted many states to enact laws staying foreclosures or excusing 
debt. Id. Massachusetts, however, refused to adopt any of these measures, and the 
farmers besieged local courts to prevent foreclosures. Id. One farmer, Daniel Shays, 
organized a militia in an attempt to seize a military arsenal. Id. Though Shays’s 
Rebellion failed, it convinced many state leaders that creditor’s rights needed 
constitutional protection. Id. Three weeks after Shays’s Rebellion collapsed, 
Congress passed a resolution calling for the Constitutional Convention of 1787. Id. 
85 Nevertheless, the Contract Clause was obscurely worded, and the history of 
the Court’s application of the clause demonstrates a strong suggestion that it was 
not drafted exclusively for the protection of creditor’s rights. Id. at 326. 
86 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 708. 
87 See id. at 706 (noting that one possible interpretation is that the clause was 
intended “to prevent the repudiation of foreign debts without interfering with the 
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from the debates at the drafting and ratifying conventions, as the 
Framers insisted that they be kept confidential.88  There is, 
however, some agreement that the Contract Clause was included 
because of the Framers’ strong beliefs that trade and commerce 
were social goods and were best fostered by stability in 
contractual obligations.89   
Attempting to remedy the interpretive problems of the 
Contract Clause through convention debates and its social-
political context is inconclusive.  Two other sources of 
information, however, inform the debate: the context in which 
the clause is written and the primary purpose of the Constitution 
as a whole.90  First, the Contract Clause is situated in the same 
section as the prohibitions of bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws.91  A bill of attainder is an act of the legislature declaring a 
person or group of persons guilty of some crime and punishing 
them without benefit of a trial,92 and an ex post facto law is one 
that unlawfully applies retroactively such as a law that renders 
an act punishable when it was not illegal when committed.93  The 
Framers, therefore, placed the Contract Clause alongside other 
 
traditional modes of economic regulation undertaken by the states,” but that there 
are “obstacles to making any definite link”). But see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. 
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 257 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
Framers intended that the Contract Clause be applied only to debtor-relief laws 
because the clause was included in the same section as other provisions regulating 
currency); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427–28 (1934) 
(contending that the Contract Clause was adopted because of the plight of debtors 
following the revolutionary period); Leo Clarke, The Contract Clause: A Basis for 
Limited Judicial Review of State Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV. 183, 188 
(1985) (stating that the Framers intended the Contract Clause “to serve the limited 
purpose of preventing the states from adopting debtor-relief laws”). 
88 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 706. 
89 See id.; see also U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[T]he 
debates in the Constitutional Convention were of little aid in the construction of the 
Contract Clause, but . . . the general purpose of the Clause [is] clear: to encourage 
trade and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contractual 
obligations.”). 
90 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 710–17. 
91 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This Clause states in full: 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant 
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any 
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill 
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of 
Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
92 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 188 (9th ed. 2009).  
93 Id. at 661. 
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seemingly absolute prohibitions on state legislatures, 
demonstrating that total judicial deference to state police powers 
while considering laws that impair contracts is antithetical to the 
Framers’ intent.94   
Second, one of the primary purposes of the Constitution is to 
place limits on the government at both the state and federal 
levels.95  The Framers saw a potential for legislative abuse and 
therefore, drafted clauses within the Constitution to curb 
legislative power yet also conserve legislative ability to enact 
laws that serve the health, safety, and welfare of the public.96  
The Contract Clause imits legislative power and thus 
substantiates the argument that complete judicial deference to 
legislative decisionmaking is inappropriate when laws impair 
contractual obligations.97 
1. The History of the Contract Clause: Case Law 
The evolution of case law dealing with Contract Clause 
violations is helpful in ascertaining the extent to which courts 
are willing to invalidate state and federal legislation that impairs 
contractual obligations.  In 1810, Chief Justice John Marshall 
expressed a desire to interpret the Contract Clause broadly.98  In 
 
94 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136–39 (1810). 
95 See id. at 136–38. 
96 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 715 (“The task of limited government, then, is 
to forge those institutions that will control the abuses of trust without depriving 
government of the powers needed to maintain the social order.”); see also Fletcher, 10 
U.S. (6 Cranch) at 138 (noting that the Framers felt some apprehension in regard to 
state sovereignties because they recognized “the violent acts which might grow out of 
the feelings of the moment”). James Madison also commented on the need to place a 
check on legislative power in the Federalist Papers:   
The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has 
directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation 
that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting 
personal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential 
speculators, and snares to the more industrious and less-informed part of 
the community. They have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but 
the first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference 
being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly 
infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish 
speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, 
and give a regular course to the business of society. 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 294 (James Madison) (John Harvard Library ed. 2009). 
97 See BENJAMIN F. WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 
15 (1938) (arguing that at least some of the Framers understood the Contract Clause 
to have a broader application); Epstein, supra note 50, at 715–17. 
98 See Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 87. 
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Fletcher v. Peck,99 the Supreme Court found a Georgia law that 
rescinded a contract for the sale of land that was made by the 
previous legislature unconstitutional under the Contract 
Clause.100  This decision made clear that the Contract Clause 
applies to public contracts—contracts to which the state is a 
party—and private contracts alike.101  Just nine years after 
Fletcher, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward,102 the Court 
specifically stated that salary contracts between the state and a 
public officer would be afforded the same constitutional 
protection as private employment contracts.103   
Despite the Marshall Court’s expansive interpretation of the 
Contract Clause, in the years following Marshall’s death, the 
Court began to limit the protection of the Contract Clause and 
afford state legislatures wider discretion.104  In Charles River 
Bridge v. Warren Bridge,105 the Court upheld Massachusetts 
legislation authorizing the construction of the Warren Bridge, 
despite a previous act that granted the Charles River Bridge 
Company an impliedly exclusive right to operate a toll bridge 
over the Charles River.106  The Court held that all ambiguities in 
public contracts would be construed in favor of the state,107 
reasoning that a more draconian application of the Contract 
Clause would unduly restrict the state’s police powers.108  Even 
after Charles River Bridge, the Court continued to expand the 
states’ police powers.109   
 
99 Id. 
100 See id. at 139. A 1795 Georgia Act divided a thirty-five million acre territory 
into four tracts and sold them to four different development companies. Id. at 89–90. 
Peck purchased land originally purchased under the 1975 Act. Id. at 127. Peck later 
sold his land to Fletcher. Id. A subsequent Georgia legislature repealed the original 
sale because it was discovered that the previous legislature sold the land because it 
was influenced by bribes. Id. at 89–90. Fletcher brought suit against Peck claiming 
that Peck sold the land without clear title. Id. at 127–28. 
101 See id. at 137–38.   
102 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
103 See id. at 694. 
104 See Lee, supra note 78, at 1638. 
105 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
106 Id. at 536–37. 
107 See id. at 544. 
108 See id. at 547.   
109 See Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1879). Mississippi amended its 
constitution to prohibit lotteries after it had granted a charter to Stone to conduct a 
lottery. Id. at 814–15. The Court held that the Contract Clause could not be used to 
limit state police powers to protect the morals and health of the public. See id. at 
819. 
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Not surprisingly, during the Great Depression, the Court 
was just as reluctant to invalidate legislation under the Contract 
Clause as it was under the Fourteenth Amendment.110  In Home 
Building & Loan v. Blaisdell,111 the Court upheld a Minnesota 
law that superseded private mortgage agreements and allowed 
mortgagors in default to delay foreclosure.112  In upholding the 
law, the Court found five factors significant, thus creating a new 
test for Contract Clause violations.  The Court found that: (1) the 
state legislature declared in the Act itself that there was an 
emergency warranting homeowner protection;113 (2) the state law 
was enacted to protect a basic societal interest, not a favored 
group;114 (3) the relief was appropriately tailored to the 
emergency that it was designed to meet;115 (4) the imposed 
conditions were reasonable;116 and (5) the legislation was limited 
to the duration of the emergency.117  While this test placed some 
limitations on states’ police powers, the Court was still adamant 
about deserting Lochnerian ideology and continued to defer to 
the states’ discretion, especially in economic legislation.118   
2. The Revitalization of the Contract Clause 
The more expansive application of the Contract Clause, once 
envisioned by the Marshall Court, was finally reignited in the 
1977 Supreme Court case, U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey.119  U.S. 
Trust arose in the wake of a national energy crisis and as a result 
of an attempt by New York and New Jersey to repeal a 1962 
 
110 See Epstein, supra note 50, at 738 (noting that the police powers expansion in 
Blaisdell “paved the way for massive government intervention that undermines the 
security of private transactions” that has, today, “eviscerate[d] the [C]ontract[ ] 
[C]lause”); Lee, supra note 78, at 1639.  
111 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
112 Id. at 416–18, 448. 
113 Id. at 444. 
114 Id. at 445. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 447. 
118 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. From the Depression and through 
the early 1970s, the Court upheld state legislation based on the police powers 
doctrine. While the five Blaisdell factors exposed the potential for a limit to state 
police powers, no clear doctrine existed. See Lee, supra note 78; see also El Paso v. 
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515–16 (1965) (upholding a Texas law imposing a statute of 
limitations on a land redemption right because the law was necessary for the public 
welfare and was only a “technical” impairment). 
119 431 U.S. 1 (1977). 
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covenant in the charter of the Port Authority that limited the 
ability of the Port Authority to “subsidize rail passenger 
transportation from revenues and reserves.”120  Port Authority 
bondholders sued, alleging that the modification was a violation 
of the Contract Clause.121  After the New Jersey Supreme Court 
upheld the repeal,122 the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated the repeal as a substantial, unreasonable, and 
unnecessary impairment of a public contract.123  
It is within U.S. Trust that the contemporary Contract 
Clause doctrine is found, which both encompasses the Blaisdell 
factors and elucidates some of the ambiguities that Blaisdell left 
behind.  Under U.S. Trust, a court must undertake a three-part 
analysis to determine whether the Contract Clause has been 
violated.  First, the court must assess whether the legislation at 
issue, in fact, impairs a contract.124  Second, the court must 
determine whether the impairment is substantial.125  Third, 
assuming that the impairment is substantial, the court must 
then determine whether the impairment is nevertheless 
reasonable126 and necessary127 to serve an important public 
purpose.128  In determining whether the impairment is 
reasonable and necessary when the state itself is a party to the 
 
120 Id. at 3. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 3–4. 
123 Id. at 28–31. 
124 See id. at 17; see also Stephen J. McGarry, Public Sector Collective 
Bargaining and the Contract Clause, 31 LAB. L.J. 67, 70 (1980) (noting that whether 
an impairment has actually taken place is “based upon the subjective expectation of 
the parties rather than the objective results of the state’s action”). 
125 To determine whether an impairment is substantial, courts must look to “the 
extent to which reasonable expectations under the contract have been disrupted.” 
Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 368 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Sanitation 
& Recycling Indus., Inc. v. City of New York, 107 F.3d 985, 993 (2d Cir. 1997)); see 
U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28; Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1015 
(4th Cir. 1993) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 244 
(1978)). 
126 In determining reasonableness, courts look to “whether the parties at the 
time of contracting had foreseen possible changed circumstances.” McGarry, supra 
note 124; see also U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32.  
127 Necessity is “to be measured by whether there [are] less drastic means or 
other alternatives available.” McGarry, supra note 124; see also U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. 
at 29–30.  
128 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28–29; see also id. at 25 (“[A]n impairment may be 
constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public 
purpose.”). 
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contract, the U.S. Trust Court specifically stated that “complete 
deference to a legislative assessment . . . is not appropriate 
because the State’s self-interest is at stake.”129  The Court, 
therefore, created a more scrutinizing standard of review for laws 
that impair public contracts, whereas almost complete deference 
is accorded to legislative judgment when only private contracts 
are impaired.130   
After an initial finding that the repeal did constitute a 
“serious impairment,”131 the U.S. Trust Court found that the 
impairment was unnecessary for two reasons.132  First, the states 
could have partially honored the covenant, rather than totally 
repeal it.133  Second, the states could have accomplished their 
goals of decreasing automobile use and encouraging mass transit 
without modifying the covenant at all.  For example, the Court 
noted, the state could have taxed gasoline and parking or 
increased bridge and tunnel tolls.134  Next, using a foreseeability 
test, the Court found that the impairment was not reasonable.135  
The Court pointed out that, though increasingly urgent because 
of the energy crisis, the need for mass rail transit and the 
problems associated with automobiles in the New York 
metropolitan area was “not a new development” and that the 
state had full knowledge of the concerns when they entered into a 
covenant in 1962.136  As illustrated, by discussing the 
foreseeability of a need for mass transit regulation at the time of 
contract and by noting other feasible alternatives to the repeal, 
the Court determined reasonableness and necessity through a 
rather discerning lens, affording the legislature virtually no 
discretion.   
 
129 Id. at 25–26. This lower level of deference is referred to as the “less deference 
standard.” 
130 See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 
412 n.14 (1983) (noting that the U.S. Trust reduced deference standard did not apply 
because the state did not alter its own contractual obligations); Buffalo Teachers 
Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 369 (explaining that when analyzing public contracts, courts use a 
different approach than that employed in analyzing private contracts).   
131 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 28. 
132 Id. at 29–30. 
133 Id. at 29–30, 31 n.28. 
134 Id. at 30, 31 n.29. 
135 Id. at 31–32. 
136 Id. 
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B. Contract Clause Jurisprudence: Not a Far Cry from Lochner 
The U.S. Trust doctrine, promulgated by the Supreme Court, 
one of Lochner’s most steadfast critics, is tantamount to a return 
to Lochnerian ideology.  Both the Fourteenth Amendment and 
the Contract Clause place restrictions on state police powers, and 
although  the Fourteenth Amendment assumed a greater role in 
adjudicating states’ rights,137 the Contact Clause is not without 
purpose.138  While Fourteenth Amendment substantive due 
process jurisprudence and the slow to mature Contract Clause 
doctrine grew up together, evolving side by side as America itself 
underwent a multitude of changes, only in the modern era do 
they meet in a significant way.  Through both its explicit 
statements—that less deference should be given to the 
legislature139—and its scrutinizing reasonable and necessary 
analysis,140 the U.S. Trust Court, like the Lochner Court, made 
very clear that there are limits to state police powers and that 
sometimes the court, not the legislature, must determine 
whether laws are reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose.   
First, Lochner did not hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
placed unbounded limitations on state police powers.141  In fact, 
the Court cited five cases in which it previously upheld state 
legislation as a valid exercise of states’ police powers,142 including 
Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison,143 in which the Court upheld state 
legislation that intended to rectify the disadvantage that coal 
miners faced in obtaining wages from their employers by 
 
137 Id. at 15. 
138 Id. at 16. 
139 Id. at 25–26. 
140 Id. at 28–31. 
141 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54–56 (1905). 
142 See id.; see also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12, 38 (1905) 
(upholding state compulsory vaccination law); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 219, 
222 (1903) (upholding state law prescribing the conditions upon which the state will 
permit work of a public character to be done for a municipality); Knoxville Iron Co. 
v. Harbison, 183 U.S. 13, 16, 22 (1901) (upholding state law regulating the way in 
which miners could obtain their wages); Petit v. Minnesota, 177 U.S. 164, 168 (1900) 
(upholding state law declaring that, as matter of law, keeping barber shops open on 
Sunday was not a work of necessity or charity); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 380, 
395 (1898) (upholding state law limiting the hours of employment in all 
underground mines or workings, smelting, and other institutions for the reduction or 
refining of ores or metals to eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where 
life or property is in imminent danger). 
143 183 U.S. 13 (1901). 
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mandating that the employer cash coal orders when presented by 
the miner.144  Instead, both the Lochner Court and the U.S. Trust 
Court simply stated that there should be limits on this police 
power.145 
Second, the U.S. Trust Court placed these limits on police 
power through a reasonable and necessary doctrine similar to 
that formulated in Lochner.146  The Lochner Court explained that 
where legislation that may offend rights granted by the 
Constitution is concerned, the court must ask whether the law is 
“a fair, reasonable, and appropriate exercise of the police power 
of the state, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary 
interference?”147  Without this analysis, the Court stated, “the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment would have no efficacy.”148  Similarly, 
the U.S. Trust Court articulated that, without a court’s inquiry 
into whether a law impairing a contractual obligation is 
reasonable and necessary to achieve an important public 
purpose, “the Contract Clause would provide no protection at all” 
because a state could just “reduce its financial obligations . . . for 
what[ever] it regarded as an important public purpose.”149   
U.S. Trust, therefore, not only revitalized the Contract 
Clause, but also unearthed Lochner.  Both the Lochner Court and 
the U.S. Trust Court recognized the need to reconcile the dueling 
constitutional goals to maintain state sovereignty and place a 
check on police powers.  In pursuing these objectives, both Courts 
devised similar methodologies.  For Contract Clause purposes, a 
Lochner-like level of review is appropriate when public contracts 
are impaired by state legislation.  Since U.S. Trust, however, 
lower courts have struggled with the amount of deference owed 
to state legislatures, most notably when state laws impair public 
sector collective bargaining agreements.150   
 
144 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 55. 
145 Id. at 56; U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. 1 at 29. 
146 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56–57. 
147 Id. at 56 (emphasis added). 
148 Id.  
149 U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 26. 
150 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 370 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[W]hat 
does giving less deference to the legislature actually mean?”). 
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III. STATE IMPAIRMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR CONTRACTS 
While the U.S. Trust doctrine has proved to give significant 
guidance to the lower courts, it has created ambiguities as to the 
amount of deference owed to state legislatures, perhaps out of a 
fear of being too Lochnerian.151  Part III first compares two recent 
cases, Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe and Fraternal Order 
of Police v. Prince George’s County.  Through these two cases, 
Part III demonstrates that lower courts struggle with the U.S. 
Trust “less deference” standard as applied to state legislation 
impairing public sector labor contracts and that there are not 
only inter-circuit splits, but also intra-circuit splits over the 
amount of deference given to legislatures.  Second, Part III 
argues that a proper application of U.S. Trust and strong public 
policy considerations demand that courts apply strict scrutiny 
when public sector labor contracts are impaired by state 
legislation, even though these laws are predominately economic 
in nature.152   
A. Lower Court Confusion: Divergent Levels of Deference Creates 
Different Levels of Protection for Public Employees—A Need 
for Uniformity 
1. The Second Circuit: Buffalo Teachers Federation v. Tobe 
In 2003, the City of Buffalo, New York faced an enormous 
fiscal crisis, and experts projected that Buffalo’s financial health 
would continue to deteriorate.153  After an investigation by the 
state comptroller,154 the state legislature enacted the Buffalo 
 
151 See id. at 370–71; Lee, supra note 78, at 1642–43. 
152 The fact that these laws are primarily economic is important because, 
traditionally, courts give greater deference to legislatures for economic and social 
legislation. This strict scrutiny of economic legislation, while appropriate and 
necessary, is a departure from modern jurisprudence. See, e.g., U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. 
at 22–23 (“As is customary in reviewing economic and social regulation, however, 
courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonableness 
of a particular measure . . . . When a State impairs the obligation of its own contract, 
the reserved-powers doctrine has a different basis.” (citation and footnote omitted)). 
153 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 365. The comptroller projected the 
following budget deficits: “$7.5 million for 2002–03, $30–$46 million for 2004–05, 
$76–$107 million for 2005–06, and $93–$127 million for 2006–07.” Id. 
154 The state comptroller determined that Buffalo’s budget deficits would 
increase exponentially over the next three years. As a result, the comptroller 
determined that Buffalo was not equipped to remedy its fiscal woes without 
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Fiscal Stability Authority Act (the “Act”), which adopted the 
recommendations of the comptroller, created the Buffalo Fiscal 
Authority (“BFSA”), and granted it the power to institute wage 
freezes.  Approximately nine months after the passage of the Act, 
the BFSA realized that the budget deficit for fiscal year 2004–
2005 would be $20 million greater than previously anticipated.155  
The BFSA, therefore, instituted a wage freeze on all covered 
employees.156  Soon thereafter, the Buffalo Teachers Union and 
several other unions (“Unions”) brought suit, seeking a judgment 
declaring that the wage freezes were, among other claims, 
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause as the wage freezes 
permanently cancelled certain wage increases to which the 
teachers were contractually entitled.157 
The Second Circuit held that wage freezes were a substantial 
impairment, as wage increases are both an inducement for 
employees to enter into a labor contract and a central provision 
on which employees reasonably rely.158  But the court ultimately 
held that the wage freezes did not violate the Contract Clause 
because it was a reasonable and necessary measure to achieve an 
important public purpose.159  The court’s application of the “less 
deference” standard in reaching its holding, however, was a 
misapplication of the U.S. Trust rule. 
First, the court incorrectly questioned which standard of 
review was applicable, when U.S. Trust makes it clear that the 
“less deference” standard is the one to apply.  The court grappled 
with the appropriate standard of review because the contracts 
were between the Unions and the City of Buffalo, rather than 
between the Unions and New York State.160  The defendants 
argued that more deference should be afforded because the state 
was not a party to the contract, while the Unions argued that 
“less deference” should be afforded because the legislation was 
 
legislative intervention and recommended the establishment of the BFSA to oversee 
Buffalo’s finances and to have the authority to institute wage freezes in the event 
that the BFSA declared a fiscal crisis. Id. at 365–66. 
155 See id. at 366. 
156 See id. at 366–67. 
157 See id. at 367; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants et al. at 9–10, Buffalo Teachers 
Fed’n, 464 F.3d 362 (No. 05-4744). 
158 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 368. 
159 See id. at 371. 
160 See id. at 369–70. 
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nevertheless self-serving.161  The court noted that such legislation 
may be self-serving even though the state was not a party but 
that “this is [not] the sort of case in which the state legislature 
‘welches’ on its obligations as a matter of ‘political 
expediency.’ ”162  Ultimately, however, the court concluded that 
they need not resolve the level of deference that is appropriate 
for such a case but that they would “assume that the lower level 
of deference applies” because “the wage freeze is reasonable and 
necessary even under the less deferential standard.”163   
From the beginning, the court’s explanation for applying a 
less deferential standard was convoluted.  By stating that this 
did not seem like a case where the legislature was acting out of 
self-interest, the court already afforded the legislature too much 
discretion.  Just because the court thought that, in this situation, 
the legislature would not act out of self-serving motives does not 
mean that the legislature did not act out of self-serving motives.  
In fact, the whole purpose of the “less deference” standard is to 
ensure that the legislature acted in the best interest of the 
public, not to assume that it did under the circumstances.164 
Second, once it concluded that the “less deference” standard 
did apply, the court then veered from U.S. Trust in its actual 
application of the standard.  The court acknowledged that the 
true meaning of the “less deference” standard is difficult to 
ascertain.165  Additionally, the court hastened to point out that 
“less deference does not imply no deference” and that less 
deference also does not mean “strict scrutiny” because, otherwise, 
“[s]uch a high level of judicial scrutiny . . . would harken a 
dangerous return to the days of Lochner v. New York.”166  While 
the U.S. Trust “less deference” standard is an elusive one and 
should be clarified by the Court, the Second Circuit should have 




161 See id.  
162 Id. at 370. 
163 Id.  
164 See Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(holding that a state-imposed payroll lag violated the Contract Clause and noting 
that “if the federal judiciary’s proper role were as supine as defendants assert it to 
be, the contract clause would be a ‘dead letter’ ”). 
165 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 370–71.  
166 Id. 
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in U.S. Trust rather than assume that it would automatically 
morph into a “superlegislature” if a strict scrutiny standard was 
applied.167   
Third, while analyzing whether the law was necessary, the 
court incorrectly stated that it need not explore whether another, 
better alternative existed to shrink the budget deficit.168  The 
U.S. Trust Court, however, did determine that other solutions 
would have been better than impairing the existing contract and 
even pointed out what those solutions were.169  Namely, when 
discussing whether the repeal was necessary, the U.S. Trust 
Court noted that the state could have raised taxes or increased 
tolls.170  In contrast, in Buffalo Teachers, although the Unions 
pointed out that the City could have further raised taxes,171 the 
court rejected this proposition, in part, because it is always 
conceivable to raise taxes to meet a fiscal crisis and because there 
was “no need to second-guess the wisdom of picking the wage 
freeze over other policy alternatives.”172  While the Second Circuit 
purported to give less deference to legislative judgment, its 
adamant refusal to scrutinize whether feasible alternatives 
existed completely fell out of line with the U.S. Trust analysis.   
Finally, Buffalo Teachers misapplied the reasonableness 
element of U.S. Trust.  Rather than using the foreseeability test 
employed in U.S. Trust,173 the Second Circuit focused only on the 
extent of the impairment caused by the wage freezes and 
concluded that the prospective and temporary nature of the wage 
freezes deemed them reasonable.174  While the U.S. Trust Court 
stated that the extent of the impairment was a factor to consider 
in assessing the reasonableness of legislation,175 the Court also 
stated that the extent of the impairment was not dispositive.176  
 
167 See id.  
168 Id. at 370. 
169 See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29–30, 31 n.29. 
170 See id. at 31 n.29. 
171 See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants et al. at 25–26, Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 
F.3d 362 (No. 05-4744). 
172 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 372. 
173 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32. 
174 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 371–72. 
175 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 27. 
176 See id. (noting that the repeal could not be sustained “simply because the 
bondholders’ rights were not totally destroyed”); see also McGarry, supra note 124, 
at 70 n.12 (noting that the U.S. Trust Court rejected the lower court’s “total 
destruction test”).   
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In fact, the Court hinged its conclusion that the repeal was 
unreasonable on given that the need to regulate automobile use 
and increase mass transit in the New York City area was known 
at the time the parties entered into the contract.177  The Second 
Circuit, therefore, completely ignored that the City of Buffalo 
may have known, or at least was able to foresee, that it would be 
unable to meet its financial obligations when it entered into the 
contracts with the Unions.  By failing to explore whether the City 
of Buffalo foresaw its looming budget deficits when it entered 
into the contracts, the court skipped an indispensible element of 
the U.S. Trust test.   
The Buffalo Teachers decision departs not only from 
Supreme Court precedent but also from other Second Circuit 
precedent, further demonstrating the rift and confusion in the 
lower courts.  In Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York,178 the Second 
Circuit adopted a “less deference” standard179 and invalidated a 
New York statute that would have financed the expansion of the 
court system by deferring the payment of court employee wages 
for two weeks.180  Not unlike the energy crisis that the state 
claimed necessitated the repeal in U.S. Trust or the exponential 
growth of budget deficits that the state claimed justified the 
wage freezes in Buffalo Teachers, in Surrogates, the state 
asserted that a fiscal crisis demanded that the pay lags be 
implemented so as to provide courts with adequate services.181   
First, Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates differed as to amount 
of consideration that is to be given to the government's 
alternatives to deal with the budgetary issue.  Relying on U.S. 
Trust and its suspicion that the state was motivated by political 
expedience, Surrogates found that the pay lags were unnecessary 
and concluded that raising taxes or shifting the cost from another 
service were less draconian alternatives, though perhaps not the 
most politically preferred.182  The court also noted that, by raising 
taxes or cutting other governmental programs, the burden is 
spread out among all of the citizens, rather than placed entirely 
 
177 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 31–32.  
178 940 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1991). 
179 See id. at 771–72. 
180 See id. 
181 See id. at 773. 
182 See id. (noting that the lag-payroll scheme “smacks of the political expediency 
that United States Trust Co. warned of”). 
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on the shoulders of the judiciary employees.183  Buffalo Teachers, 
on the other hand, expressly dismissed these alternatives.184   
Second, Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates differed in the 
weight given to the existence of an “emergency.”  Buffalo 
Teachers attempted to distinguish itself from Surrogates because, 
unlike Surrogates, Buffalo faced a real emergency.185  In fact, the 
court stated that its holding could be summed up by the fact that, 
“[a]n emergency exists in Buffalo that furnishes a proper 
occasion for the state and BFSA to impose a wage freeze to 
‘protect the vital interests of the community,’ and the existence of 
the emergency ‘cannot be regarded as a subterfuge or as lacking 
in adequate basis.’ ”186  Through this attempt, however, rather 
than expose that a different holding was warranted, Buffalo 
Teachers further revealed its misapplication of U.S. Trust.  
Buffalo Teachers’ emphasis on the existence of an emergency is a 
departure from both Surrogates, which gave no weight to 
whether there was an emergency, and U.S. Trust, which does not 
require such an analysis.   The existence of an emergency as a 
relevant factor in determining the legitimacy of state legislation 
was first incorporated in the 1934 Blaisdell decision, but was one 
of five considerations.187  Never in Supreme Court Contract 
Clause jurisprudence was the existence of an emergency a 
dispositive factor in upholding state legislation.188  Moreover, 
under the modern Contract Clause analysis articulated by the 
U.S. Trust Court, the existence of an emergency situation is no 
longer necessary.189  If, to uphold state legislation, the existence 
of an emergency is no longer a necessary condition, then it is 





183 See id. 
184 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372 (2d Cir. 2006). 
185 See id. at 372–73.  
186 Id. at 373 (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 
(1934)). 
187 See supra notes 111–17 and accompanying text. 
188 See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 444; Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & 
Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–12 (1983). 
189 See Energy Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412; U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 
1, 22 (1977); Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg & Loan Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32, 38–40 (1940). 
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itself, to sustain state legislation.190  In Buffalo Teachers, 
therefore, the Second Circuit departed from both its own and 
Supreme Court precedent.191   
2. The Fourth Circuit: Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince 
George’s County 
The most recent case deciding the constitutionality of 
legislation impairing a public sector labor contract is Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge No. 89 v. Prince George’s County.192  Unlike 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Buffalo Teachers193 and a previous 
Fourth Circuit decision, Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor,194 
the Prince George’s Court, a district court within the Fourth 
Circuit, held that furloughs implemented by the county violated 
the Contract Clause.195  While all three cases arose under similar 
factual situations—public employees challenged a legislative 
effort to meet financial shortcomings by withholding promised 
wages—the Prince George’s district court decision reached a 
different result.196   
As did Buffalo Teachers and Surrogates, the Prince George’s 
case arose out of a legislative act to reduce budget deficits by 
cutting public employees’ contractually promised wages.  In 
September of 2008, Prince George’s County attempted to close a 
$57 million budget gap by $20 million by implementing an 
Employee Furlough Plan (“EFP”), which temporarily furloughed 
approximately 5,900 County employees.197  These public 
employees were members of various Unions, including the 
Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 89, the International Fire 
Fighters Association Prince George’s County Local 1619, Inc., 
 
190 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 23 n.19 (“Undoubtedly the existence of an 
emergency and the limited duration of a relief measure are factors to be assessed in 
determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but they cannot be regarded as 
essential in every case.”). 
191 Compare Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 36–73, with Ass’n of Surrogates 
v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 771–74 (2d Cir. 1991), and U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 20–32. 
192 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 518 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 608 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010). 
193 See Buffalo Teachers Fed’n, 464 F.3d at 373 (holding a wage freeze was a 
reasonable and necessary impairment under the Contract Clause). 
194 See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that furloughs were an impairment permitted under the Contract Clause). 
195 See 645 F. Supp. 2d at 518. Again, it is important to note that the district 
court was overruled by the Fourth Circuit. See Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d at 193 
(4th Cir. 2010). 
196 Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 518–19. 
197 See id. at 500–01. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 1179 (2010) 
2010] JUDICIAL REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1207 
and the American Federation of State and Municipal Employees 
(“AFSCME”), AFL-CIO.198  By cutting the work hours of all 
covered employees by eighty-eight hours during fiscal year 2009, 
the EFP effectively reduced these employees’ annual salaries by 
3.85%.199  Consequently, the Unions brought suit against the 
County in federal court, alleging, in part, that the EFP violated 
the Contract Clause.200   
The factual context in Prince George’s was remarkably 
similar to a 1993 Fourth Circuit case, Baltimore Teachers, in 
which Baltimore, in response to a budgetary shortfall, 
implemented a plan under which it ultimately reduced the 
annual salaries of public employees by approximately one 
percent through deductions from five of their semi-monthly 
paychecks.201  Claiming to have followed U.S. Trust,  Baltimore 
Teachers found the salary reductions to be permitted under the 
Contract Clause.202  However, in doing so, it misapplied that 
standard by ignoring the distinction between public and private 
contracts and affording the legislature too much discretion.  More 
than fifteen years later, Prince George’s purported to “follow the 
lead” of both the Fourth Circuit in Baltimore Teachers and the 
Supreme Court in U.S. Trust.203  Prince George’s, however, more 
appropriately adhered to the U.S. Trust standard than did 
Baltimore Teachers.204   
Prince George’s and Baltimore Teachers both correctly 
identified the nature of the harm caused by the governmental 
action.  Both courts properly began with finding that a contract 
existed between the unions and the government and the 
legislation enacted to reduce the budget deficits was a 
“substantial impairment” of the collective bargaining 
agreements205 because, under Supreme Court precedent, “the 
right abridged was one that induced the parties to contract in the 
 
198 See id. at 494. 
199 See id. at 501. 
200 See id. 
201 See Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993). 
202 See id. at 1022. 
203 See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 509–10. 
204 See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1019 (explaining that “less” deference still 
permits the court to give some deference to the legislature); Lee, supra note 78, at 
1643–49. 
205 See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1015; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 509–
10. 
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first place.”206  Baltimore Teachers noted that, in the employment 
context, there is perhaps no contractual component that induces 
parties to contract and on which parties rely on more than 
compensation.207  Following suit, the Prince George’s Court noted 
that the EFP constituted a substantial impairment because, as 
implemented, it abridged the compensation for which the union 
employees bargained and subjected every employee to a loss of 
eighty hours of pay.208   
Where Baltimore Teachers and Prince George’s departed is in 
the examination of the reasonableness and necessity of the 
contract impairing legislation.209  Baltimore Teachers, unlike 
Prince George’s, misapplied the reasonableness element.  Where 
U.S. Trust focused on whether the impairing state action was a 
response to an unforeseen change of circumstances,210 Baltimore 
Teachers acknowledged the U.S. Trust foreseeability test only in 
a footnote, but never inquired as to whether Baltimore faced an 
unforeseen change in circumstances, prompting the city to 
implement the furloughs.211  Instead, Baltimore Teachers found 
the impairment was reasonable based on factors that are 
traditionally considered when private contracts are impaired.212  
 
206 Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1017 (citing El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514 
(1965) and Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 235, 243 n.14 (1978)).   
207 See id. at 1018. 
208 See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 510. It was with the first prong of 
the Contract Clause analysis that the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court. Prince George’s II, 608 F.3d at 189. The Fourth Circuit found that the district 
court erred in ruling that the collective bargaining agreements were impaired. Id. at 
190. According to the Fourth Circuit, the Prince George’s County Personnel Law 
included the authorization for furloughs. Because “[i]t is a cardinal principle of 
contract interpretation that the parties are presumed to contract against the 
backdrop of relevant law . . . all . . . relevant laws must be read into the agreement of 
the parties just as if expressly provided by them.” Id. at 191. Therefore, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded, because the Personnel Law authorized furloughs, the Unions’ 
collective bargaining agreements included a provision permitting furloughs. Id. 
Thus, there was no impairment and the Unions’ Contract Clause claims failed. It is 
important to note, however, that although the Fourth Circuit overruled the district 
court, the Fourth Circuit did not criticize, or even mention, the district court’s level 
of review. 
209 See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1018; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 510–
11. 
210 See U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1977). 
211 See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1021 n.13. 
212 See id. at 1021 (“[T]he furlough plan possessed, not insignificantly, each of 
the attributes identified in Spannaus as present in various state laws that had 
impaired private contracts but survived Contract Clause challenge.” (emphasis 
added)). The court found that the salary reduction plan was reasonable because it 
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Prince George’s, on the other hand, found that the furloughs were 
not reasonable because the plan was not narrowly tailored and 
the shortfalls were perhaps foreseeable.213  Prince George’s, 
therefore, applied the appropriate reasonableness test.   
Moving on to the necessary analysis, Prince George’s more 
accurately followed the U.S. Trust test, from which the Baltimore 
Teachers Court again departed.214  Part of the Supreme Court’s 
necessity inquiry hinged on the existence of feasible alternatives.  
One of the alternatives the Court took note of in U.S. Trust was 
the ability of the state to raise taxes.  Ignoring the Supreme 
Court’s indication that governments should virtually always be 
held to their financial obligations,215 Baltimore Teachers refused 
to even consider the alternative of raising taxes because it 
believed that this alternative would always be available to 
overturn a state’s impairment of its own financial obligations.216   
Prince George’s and Baltimore Teachers also varied as to 
their analysis of the necessity of the government's actions.  In 
contrast, Prince George’s noted that the furloughs were not 
necessary because the county had $97 million in untapped 
reserve funds when it implemented the furloughs.  The court 
noted that, without an attempt to first use some of that money to 
close the budget gaps, the county did not adequately exhaust 
 
was aimed to deal with a broad, generalized economic problem, it targeted all 
employees, rather than a specific class of employees, it “affected reliance interests 
not wholly unlike those of private entities in regulated industries, which contract 
subject to future, additional regulation,” and it affected only a temporary alteration 
of the contractual relationship. Id. (emphasis added). 
213 Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 512 (emphasis added). Interestingly, 
Prince George’s cited to page 1020 of Baltimore Teachers when it mentioned its 
reservations about whether the shortfalls were unforeseen. Id. Nowhere on page 
1020, or anywhere in the Baltimore Teachers opinion, however, does the word 
“unforeseen” appear. See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1020. 
214 See Lee, supra note 78, at 1646. 
215 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 25. The Court quoted the following passage: 
The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to 
repay it with interest, are not acting as sovereignties . . . . [T]he contract 
should be regarded as an assurance that such a right will not be exercised. 
A promise to pay, with a reserved right to deny or change the effect of the 
promise, is an absurdity.  
Id. at 25 n.23 (quoting Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)); see also 
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14 
(1983) (“In almost every case, the Court has held a governmental unit to its 
contractual obligations when it enters financial or other markets.”). 
216 See Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1019–20. 
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other feasible alternatives.217  In concluding its analysis for 
whether the furloughs were necessary, Prince George’s again 
mentioned that, under the Contract Clause, the county does not 
enjoy “wide discretionary latitude” in choosing among 
alternatives to remedy its fiscal problems.218  And, the court 
made clear that while it would not instruct the county on its 
fiscal affairs, it believed that other, less draconian and more 
feasible alternatives existed.219  Finally, the court articulated its 
suspicion that the furloughs were merely a politically expedient 
method to accomplish the county’s goal to reduce its budget 
deficit and that such a motive is one that the Contract Clause 
exists, in part, to prevent.220   
The dichotomous holdings and the varying level of deference 
afforded to the legislatures, both within and among the circuits, 
illustrate the inconsistencies amid the lower courts in applying 
the third prong of the U.S. Trust test.221  As a more scrutinizing 
level of review has proven to result in finding furloughs, wage 
 
217 See Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 517. 
218 See id. at 516. 
219 Id. at 513. 
220 Id. at 510–11. 
221 The Second and Fourth Circuits are not the only courts that have reviewed 
this issue. In 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld 
a preliminary injunction preventing the state from implementing delays in issuance 
of pay checks pursuant to a statute because the statutory scheme represented 
substantial impairment of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement for Contracts 
Clause purposes, and the state failed to demonstrate that the statute delaying 
issuance of payroll checks was “reasonable and necessary to fulfill an important 
public purpose in light of Hawaii’s budgetary crisis.” Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly 
v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999). Additionally, in 1997, the District 
of Columbia Circuit held that emergency rules establishing reduction-in-force 
(“RIF”) procedures were expressly authorized by congressional legislation and, thus, 
were insulated from challenge under the Contract Clause when teachers who were 
laid off during a RIF sued the board of education. Wash. Teachers’ Union Local #6 v. 
Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In 1995, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court ruled that furloughs imposed, in response to a fiscal crisis, on 
unionized state employees earning more than $20,000 violated the Contract Clause 
because they were neither reasonable nor necessary. Mass. Cmty. Coll. Counsel v. 
Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 716 (Mass. 1995). Moreover, in 1992, in response to 
a House of Representatives opinion request on the constitutionality of state-imposed 
furloughs, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the furloughs were, in fact, 
a violation of the Contract Clause as unreasonable and unnecessary impairments of 
state employees’ collective bargaining agreements. Opinion of the Justices 
(Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204, 1212 (N.H. 1992). Finally, in 1985, the Supreme Court of 
Washington held that a declared financial emergency did not justify the state’s 
legislatively authorized refusal to implement bargained-for salary increases for 
certain state employees. Carlstrom v. State, 694 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Wash. 1985). 
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freezes, payroll lags, and other contract impairing legislation 
unconstitutional under the Contract Clause, varying levels of 
judicial deference directly correlates to the amount of protection 
extended to public employees.  The divergent results throughout 
the country juxtaposed with the increasing frequency at which 
legislatures resort to these types of deficit-reducing means 
demonstrates the need for the Supreme Court to review this 
issue so that there may be a uniform level of review and a 
consistent level of protection afforded to public employees.   
B. The Need for Strict Scrutiny in Legislation that Impairs 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Agreements: Why 
Lochner Still Lives 
As evidenced by the varied amount of scrutiny that lower 
courts apply to state laws that impair public contracts, the U.S. 
Trust “less deference” standard has proven to obscure rather 
than elucidate.222  In modern constitutional jurisprudence, courts 
apply minimal scrutiny to economic and social legislation and 
strict scrutiny to legislation that offends personal liberties.223  
The level of scrutiny for Contract Clause violations, therefore, 
should conform to one of these customary approaches.  Even 
though Contract Clause claims arise predominately out of 
economic or social legislation, it seems as though the U.S. Trust 
Court intended to rule that strict scrutiny should be applied 
when public contracts are impaired because “a state’s self 
interest is at stake.”224  This standard would not only resolve the 
inconsistencies in the lower courts but also appeal to the 
enormous public interest that demands that strict scrutiny be 
applied to laws that impair public sector labor contracts.   
As several lower courts that have been more willing to apply 
strict scrutiny have commented, public employees deserve the 
utmost protection.225  A common denominator of most of the 
public sector Contract Clause litigation is some sort of financial 
 
222 See supra Part III.A and cases cited within. 
223 See note 50 and accompanying text. 
224 U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1977) (noting that “[a] 
governmental entity can always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do 
not have to be raised”). 
225 See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1105 (citing Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940 
F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
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or economic crisis.226  The states or local governments enter into 
collective bargaining agreements with public sector labor unions, 
guaranteeing, among other things, certain hours and wages.  But 
then, at the first sign of an economic downturn, these 
governments take drastic measures, such as furloughs or wage 
freezes, that substantially impair these contracts.227  As the 
Second and Ninth Circuits correctly noted, while soaring budget 
deficits may seem to justify such drastic legislative acts, in the 
government’s attempt to lessen its own fiscal crisis, it creates and 
exacerbates public employees’ financial hardships.228   
This logic demonstrates that implementing furloughs or 
wage freezes solves one economic problem simply by causing 
countless others.  Significantly decreasing the income of these 
already underpaid public sector employees will likely have an 
adverse ripple effect on other already devastated markets, such 
as the housing industry and the auto industry, due to their 
inability to meet their financial commitments.229  John and 
Carrie Anne Quintos of Chino California, state workers whose 
combined $70,000 annual salary was cut by fourteen percent due 
to the furloughs, are an example of how the furloughs simply 
perpetuate a vicious circle.230  As a result of their pay cuts, the 
Quintos’s could no longer afford their car payments or their home 
mortgage payments and, because they owed more than the 
property was worth, they were forced to sublet, rather than 
sell.231  Their tenants, however, missed a few payments, causing 




226 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 13–14; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d 492, 
494–95 (D. Md. 2009), rev’d, 408 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010); Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. 
Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 365 (2d Cir. 2006); Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 
F.3d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1993). 
227 See U.S. Trust, 431 U.S. at 13–14; Prince George’s I, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 494–
95; Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 365; Balt. Teachers, 6 F.3d at 1014. 
228 See Cayetano, 183 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Ass’n of Surrogates v. New York, 940 
F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
229 See id.; Clarke, supra note 87, at 248–50 (endorsing the U.S. Trust rationale 
because it protects individual reliance interests and encourages states to contract 
efficiently); Lee, supra note 78, at 1649 (noting that the higher scrutiny mandated in 
U.S. Trust promotes economic stability).  
230 Goldmacher, supra note 1. 
231 Id. 
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behind in rent they were paying to live in a townhouse.232  
Ultimately, their car was repossessed in a parking lot, and they 
were forced to relinquish the townhouse.233 
In addition to meeting individual financial obligations, these 
public employees rely on the promised wages to afford other 
common necessities, such as food, clothing, and their children’s 
education.234  While these life-sustaining items are not 
enumerated as fundamental rights in the text of the 
Constitution, most would concede that they are no less 
fundamental than the right to speak one’s mind or choose one’s 
own religion.  If the courts must apply strict scrutiny to 
legislation that inhibits individuals’ rights to practice a religion 
of their choosing, then it is not farfetched to require the courts to 
apply strict scrutiny to legislation that will deprive public 
employees of the means to purchase basic human needs.   
Furthermore, a more scrutinizing review of contract-
impairing legislation will accommodate other policy 
considerations.  First, a relaxed Contract Clause will give state 
legislatures greater power to unilaterally modify the agreements 
they enter into, thus inflating the risk component of the contract 
price.235  Therefore, employees may demand a risk premium 
before agreeing to work due to a magnified fear that the state 
will breach.236  Consequently, the state will have to pay more for 
public contracts237 or reduce the quality of services offered.238  
Increasing risk premiums, therefore, will reduce economic 
stability and diminish faith in contractual relations—results 
antithetical to both U.S. Trust and the larger purpose of the 
Contract Clause itself. 
Another policy consideration is that public employees are, 
among other indispensible occupations, our police, our 
firefighters, our teachers, our sanitation and mass transit 
workers.  Without them, gangs, not justice, would rule the 
 
232 Id. 
233 Id. John moved in with his parents thirty miles away; Carrie Ann stayed in 
Chino with their four children. Id. 
234 See Univ. of Haw. Prof’l Assembly v. Cayetano, 183 F.3d 1096, 1105 (9th Cir. 
1999) (noting that food and clothing are necessities of life); Lee, supra note 78, at 
1645. 
235 See Clarke, supra note 87, at 242–43. 
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streets, fires would blaze unabated, children would go untaught, 
garbage would linger, and the pace of our days would come to a 
halt.  If laws that impair these public employees’ contracts need 
only to stand the test of minimum scrutiny, then they would be 
sustained more often than invalidated.239  Accordingly, public 
employees who doubt the stability of their contracts would 
perform less efficiently on the job and be less dedicated to their 
work.240  The risk of reducing the efficiency, productivity, and 
commitment of public sector employees far outweighs the 
inconvenience of forcing policy makers to rethink their legislative 
schemes. 
Despite these compelling policy considerations, however, 
some argue that the U.S. Trust “less deference” standard—and 
therefore, the strict scrutiny standard—provides too much 
protection for public contracts241 and is an inexcusable return to 
Lochner-like judicial intrusion on legislative judgment.242  But it 
is time to stop fearing judicial oversight into legislative action 
that impairs the state’s own financial obligations.  Such review 
will not revive an era defined by the judiciary sitting as a 
superlegislature—those days are gone.243  When public contracts, 
especially public sector labor contracts, are impaired by self-
serving state legislation, it is the court’s constitutional duty to 
question the reasonableness and necessity of that legislation in 
accordance with the Contract Clause.244   
 
239 See, e.g., Buffalo Teachers Fed’n v. Tobe, 464 F.3d 362, 372–73 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Balt. Teachers Union v. Mayor of Balt., 6 F.3d 1012, 1022 (4th Cir. 1993). 
240 See Lee, supra note 78, at 1650. 
241 See Clarke, supra note 87, at 251–52 (suggesting that the U.S. Trust test 
should be replaced with an approach that would invoke Contract Clause protection 
only upon legislative failure “to recognize the reliance interests of the contractors”). 
242 Buffalo Teachers, 464 F.3d at 371 (noting that applying strict scrutiny to the 
government’s wage freezes would be a dangerous return to the long discarded 
Lochner). 
243 See Barnett, supra note 19 (asserting that “the real problem with the 
judiciary today is not that it has thwarted the majority’s will, but that it has 
succumbed to it”). 
244 See Randy Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservativism v. A Principled 
Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 273, 276 (1987) (“Judges are therefore 
inescapably responsible for developing, justifying, and applying substantive rules 
and standards for normatively evaluating human conduct—including the conduct of 
legislatures acting collectively.” (emphasis added)). 
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This level of review is not repugnant to the constitutional 
notion of separation of powers.245  To begin, requiring the courts 
to strictly scrutinize laws that impair public contracts does not 
correlate to a sanction for the courts to proclaim what, in their 
view, the laws should be—a role reserved for the legislature.  
Instead, permitting the courts to strictly scrutinize public-
contract impairing legislation enables the courts to fulfill their 
duty to declare what the law, under the Constitution of the 
United States, cannot be.   
At least in the application of Contract Clause doctrine to 
public sector labor contracts, the courts are—and those that are 
not, should be—moving toward a judicial approach that 
constitutional law scholar Randy Barnett refers to as “Footnote 
Four-Plus.”246  Under “Footnote Four-Plus” jurisprudence—a 
compromise of sort between judicial conservatives and 
progressives—courts enforce the express prohibitions of the 
Constitution plus “some judicially-selected ‘fundamental’ 
unenumerated rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition,’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.’ ”247  This approach strikes an appropriate balance 
between judicial passivity and activism by allowing the courts to 
defer to the legislature where no fundamental enumerated or 
unenumerated rights are violated yet also to make calculated, 
responsible decisions to protect certain unenumerated individual 
rights when necessary.248 
Additionally, all federal judges, and many state judges, are 
not elected, but are appointed to decide between conflicting 
claims of right.249  Judges are appointed with the expectation and 
belief that they will decide cases in a “principled and morally 
justified manner”250 and that they will both adhere to the black 
letter law and develop a common law system comprised of 
 
245 See id. (noting that federal judges have no authority to exercise executive 
functions or to spend state or federal tax moneys).  
246 See Barnett, supra note 254, at 328 (noting that judicial conservatives strictly 
adhere to the rule espoused in footnote four of the Caroline Products decision—that 
state legislation should be strictly scrutinized only when enumerated constitutional 
rights are transgressed). 
247 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
248 Professor Barnett also refers to this judicial role as “principled judicial 
activism.” See Barnett, supra note 244, at 276–77. 
249 See id. at 277 (noting that even those judges that are elected are not elected 
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250 Id. at 286. 
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“substantive standards that are as much a product of collective 
wisdom as the statutory output of Congress.”251  The American 
legal system thus affords the judiciary significant power but also 
has great faith that that power will be used responsibly.  Finally, 
the appellate process exists as an internal self-regulating 
mechanism,252 and the Constitution provides two important 
external safeguards on the judiciary:  The Senate may scrutinize 
the judicial philosophy of all judicial appointments, and the 
Senate may impeach federal judges.253  An abuse of judicial 
power, therefore, will not go unnoticed or unchecked.  
CONCLUSION 
While Lochner likely did reach the wrong result, it is time to 
doubt that both its holding and its use of substantive due process 
were wrong.254  As stated by the Lochner Court,  
This is not a question of substituting the judgment of the court 
for that of the legislature.  If the act be within the power of the 
state it is valid, although the judgment of the court might be 
totally opposed to the enactment of such a law.  But the 
question would still remain:  Is it within the police power of the 
state? and that question must be answered by the court.255 
As illustrated, even the reviled Lochner Court knew and 
appreciated that there were limits to judicial review, but also saw 
that there was a need for the judiciary to ensure that the 
legislature was acting within its powers.   
Though Lochner may still be regarded as a reprehensible 
usurpation of legislative power or an illegitimate intrusion of 
laissez faire economic policy into constitutional analysis, this 
interpretation is no longer entirely controlling.  Where 
Lochnerian jurisprudence once deprived workers of state 
protection from unscrupulous employers, it now has the 
potential, if used appropriately and responsibly, to shield 
workers from politically expedient state legislation.256  Over one 
 
251 Id. at 287. 
252 See id. 
253 See id. 
254 See Randy Barnett, Foreword: What’s So Wicked About Lochner?, 1 N.Y.U. 
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hundred years after it was decided and over seventy years after 
it was abandoned, as ironic as it is, perhaps now we see that from 
Lochner comes enlightenment.   
 
 
The great danger is that, once in office, legislators need no longer rely upon 
naked aggression to exact private gain, but can instead enlist the force of 
the state by passing laws that work to advance their own interests at the 
expense of the public or some part of it. Legislators, in other words, cannot 
be given the power of absolute owners because they hold power as trustees 
for the benefit of the public. The old maxim, “A public office is a public 
trust,” is not simply metaphor. Those entrusted with public power act as 
fiduciaries and must avoid conflicts of interest every bit as much as private 
trustees who hold the reins of power for private beneficiaries. 
Id.  
